The security failures at the Munich Olympic Games are attributed to the shootout that was conducted by the Black September terrorist gang members. The shootout illustrated the lack of preparedness of the German authorities towards the possibility of such a situation. The security failures noticed from the situation include the inability of the German army to participate in the attempted rescue. The factor resulted from the post-war West German constitution that forbade the German army to operate inside Germany during peacetime. German failed to take into consideration the case of an emergency, such as the experienced case. As a result, the rescue mission was solely left to the Munich police and the Bavarian authorities, who could not promptly handle the situation.
Another security failure includes that the information of the terrorists was well known approximately half an hour before the arrival of the hostages and the kidnappers at Furstenfeld Bruck that the actual number of the kidnappers was larger than it was initially believed. Despite this knowledge, Schreiber went on with the initially planned rescue mission (Bunso Bryant, 2017). Additionally, this new information could not be conveyed to the snippers responsible for the rescue mission as they did not have radios for communication.
The lack of radio contact between the snippers and wone another, and between the snippers and the German authorities also presented a significant security failure. The snippers were not able to coordinate their operations, a factor that increased the advantage to the attackers (Bunso Bryant, 2017). The instructions that the nippers received was significantly vague, with each nipper left with the responsibility to act on their own accord. Additionally, the snipper was not provided efficient protective gear for the hostage rescue operations. The weapons used by the snippers were not well efficient for the distance at which the snippers attempted to shoot.
The terrorist attack was followed by the reaction of both Israel and German. After the attack, the Israel Defense Committee authorized The Mossad to track and kill the alleged terrorists. While the Israeli authority argued that the authorization was to facilitate the need to end the type of terror attack perpetrated, there is the counter-argument that the mission was mainly motivated by the desire for vengeance. Israel argued that it had no other choice but to exact justice. According to the Israel authorities, the actions of Israel were as a result of necessity. There was creating a target list through the use of information generated by friendly European intelligence services. It was then followed by a wide wave of the assassination of Black September operators across Europe.
On the side of the German operations after the incident, there was an alleged German cover-up of the massacre by the German authorities. The German authorities were unwilling to release information regarding the attack. Also, the German authorities refused to take responsibility for the outcome of the attack. There were allegations that the German government was hiding a significant number of files that contained vital information regarding the massacre. The cover-up by the German authorities could present a dangerous outcome following the fact that it provides cover and security for the terrorist group. The German authorities increase the chances of the terrorist to engage in a successful bargain since they are not ready to provide open information regarding the shooting incident. The faillure to openly shun and talk about terrorist activities increases the power of the terrorists (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2017). Terrorists are at an advantaged position to issues their demands and have the demands fulfilled by their victims. It would consequently be necessary for the German authorities to boldly speak out regarding the terrorist activities to facilitate the defeat of the terrorists.
