Security, success, and liberty are fundamental elements for a strong, self-assured, and governing America. This is America, which has all that it takes to maintain peace, uphold liberty, and lead in a foreign country. This is what the American Army and the rest of its service men and women aim to accomplish ; a secure, flourishing, and free nation with the power and assurance to lead in the global sphere. They are projected to undertake their duty notwithstanding the situations. Nonetheless, the start of the COVID-19 epidemic has compromised the Army’s capability to thoroughly perform its mandate as most of its personnel, both uniformed and civilian, are compelled to execute their duties from home. As a result, this development demands the need for the Army to let personnel gain accessibility to confidential information tenuously. In this mode, the remote users may gain accessibility to classified data and non-classified, delicate data from their remote stations, as well their homes.
The universal security situation is gradually becoming intricate. It is glaring at explicit challenges to the open and free universal order and the recurrence of premeditated competition amongst countries. With these alterations, it is important to conduct a clear-eyed evaluation of the dangers faced by the United States, recognize the varying element of warfare, and alter how the Department of Defense (DoD) carries out its mandate. The novel corona pandemic is rapidly spreading globally, and it contaminates broadly without favor odf an individual’s work or livelihood. Devoid of restraint and change of discretion, the Army might suffer significantly that it might not be in a position to perform its mandate and sustain with the varying element of warfare. COVID-19 has altered how people perform their mandates, a clear fact witnessed in small companies to the state defense. Therefore, the U.S. Army comprehends the need to alter its mode of performing the duties and is implementing approaches that let several service men and women to undertake their responsibilities tenuously. Presently, the Army does not sanction remote accessibility to classified data, apart from extraordinary situations. There is similarly the element of cyber-attack in which the antagonists might obtain confidential data and anti-terrorist tool against the United States. With the probability of a second wave pandemic, it is important for the U.S. Military to ways of that would let its staff obtain classified data tenuously while at the same time guaranteeing it protects this data from cyberattacks may compromise national safety.
The Military will contemplate on possible alterations that may refer to its policy, organization, preparation, materials, style of leadership, recruits, amenities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). The DOTMLPF-P resolutions will be accomplished through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), an iterative procedure that shapes the purchase requests and assessment standards for the planned defense development plans. The regions of emphasis based on the DOTMLPF-P alterations in the context of this challenge include the doctrine. The doctrinal alterations resultant from the distant accessibility of classified data regarding the United States Military. The second aspect involves the Organization: The organization domain resolutions emphasize on rolling out a competency program that allows remote accessibility to delicate and confidential data. Establishment of a remote accessibility point for confidential data during the epidemic keeps military staffs working from home where likely to guarantee minimal distraction of the operations during the pandemic. This compels changes to the forces’ organization and distribution of apparatus in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of the involved units. The next aspect involves training. The personnel executing their mandates remotely will go through focused training to utilize the essential technologies devoid of exposing hackers’ delicate data. The subsequent element involves materials. Implementing a secure platform for distribution of private data with the personnel is the superlative approach to obtain the data while safeguarding from cyberattacks. In this case, is cooperating with the U.S. Army CIO/G-6, an organization that defends the Army systems, to collect, “user needs for prioritizing,” They also work to guarantee the platforms security. Personnel alterations will be essential for staff to perform their tasks from home. The COVID-19 epidemic dictates the alteration.
A possible organizational resolution to the requisite to access delicate and confidential military data remotely during this epidemic involves rolling out an online structure that would offer an accessibility platform. This will provide a framework to execute the functions from home to avoid any instance of compromising the United States’ Military mandates and the nation’s safety. An additional organizational resolution would involve using online computers with no remote storage for remote processes. This may involve the supply of specific types of nodes and an expressly designed operating system. The designated vendors ought to initiate resolutions that adhere to these provisions. Security is America’s precedence, and while there is the risk of cyber-attacks, executing mandates remotely may be important to boost operations.
Moreover, functioning from home may become the new norm for the Army. There ought to be practical developments to working from home and the mechanisms that have been implemented. The Army should aim towards developing a virtual realm for smoother and more progressive military processes. This will involve integrating advanced technology that has been established with more technological advancements in the course of development.
Material development is essential for development of a platform that may allow safe access to confidential military data. Intrinsically, a Materiel Development Decision (MDD) that institutes a five-phased procedure of the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) will be made. The first phase would involve Materiel Solutions Analysis, and this may entail the creation of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). According to the requirements of ICD, the subsequent material resolution must do, should do, and could do. For the advanced online mode to be beneficial as an efficient mode of disseminating classified military data, it has been inclusive enough to obtain the data in real-time. The platform should be safe enough to endure cyber-attacks from enemies, in this case, nations such as China or Russia, terrorist corporations, or discrete attackers.
The Second phase of the DAS will evaluate the current state of technological perceptions that match the requests and evaluates the possible threats and approaches to advance the technology to alleviate the risk. The magnitude of technological advances that are presently in position would allow the development of this system. Moreover, it is likely to use simulated desktops that do not store data on the end-user side. Another method involves encryption measures that would guarantee the security of the data shared by restricting access only to sanctioned service men.
Additional DOTMLPF-P domain that will be affected by this resolution is “policy.” The Military may be compelled to alter its policy to disseminate confidential data in response to the existing conditions. This is essential to permit the distant sharing of the data. This will, obviously call for tighter procedures to improve this data’s safety and protect it from possible assaults.
Incorporating the concept of virtual access to classified information to the Army will be analyzed through the Force Integration Functional Area (FIFA). An aspect of FIFA that would be crucial in this process is equipping. The Army’s Network Enterprise Technology Command will identify the merchant for the vital computers and network security structures and the firm in control of their maintenance. Maintenance of the new platform will be a thought-provoking undertaking that will necessitate additional training and apparatus that the Military may find very exorbitant. This informs why the system maintenance will have to be commissioned out, and this will most definitely be contracted to the bodies that will advance the systems.
Combatant Commanders, principally in expected future battle areas, offer an input to the Secretary of Defense on the apprehensions and forces needs. This data feeds into the Services’ financial plan appeals, which eventually feeds into the National Defense Authorization Act where Congress sanctions military funding. Congressional endorsement of the backing essential to carry out research and obtain SMR abilities for future battles and crises is foundational to the capability to cultivate, obtain and uphold SMRs.
Through Sustainable Readiness, the Army preserves a tiered readiness level to retort to worldwide catastrophes across the war continuum. Presently, CCDRs depend on on the capability of Quartermaster Composite Support Company for Class III(B) backing to the CSA, whilst Division Commanders are dependent on Sustainment Brigades and Forward Support Corporations to withstand processes within the AOR. SMRs will offer a long-term resolution to the Military’s challenge of pushing fuel forward to withstand maneuver fundamentals along with the amalgamation of gains regions.
Although the SMR is an operational reach amplifier during LSCO, it has other applications that will enable the Army to support operations on the low-end of the conflict continuum. During Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions, the SMR offers a ready-made solution to restoring electricity and essential services in the affected area.
Sanctioning remote access to the confidential data will guarantee the Army operations’ steadiness whilst maintaining staff safety from coronavirus pandemic. Failing to reserve this resolution would put the Military at risk of being surpassed by its opponents and challengers, particularly when there is a requirement for Large-Scale Combat Processes (LSCO) and MultiDomain Operations (MDO). Nonetheless, this resolution may require more funding and resources as there will be a necessity to source the personnel with explicit computer machines and a specifically designed operating system and training the personnel on ways of operating the nodes.
CPT Jacob A. Elders, US Army, Logistics, Staff Group 6D, firstname.lastname@example.org.
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